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Abstract 
 
In “The Tropicalization of Proportionality Balancing: the Colombian and 
Mexican Examples” the author analyzes how the German based proportionality 
balancing test was exported to Latin America, by studying the Colombian 
Constitutional Court and the Mexican Supreme Court.  
This work is guided by the following questions: what is proportionality 
balancing? How has it been used by the Colombian and Mexican jurisprudences 
and what are its influences? Do the Courts cite other jurisdictions when using the 
test? Have they imported a traditional European test? Or, have they “tropicalized” 
it?  
The study of the Latin American examples leads to the conclusion that the 
Courts have “tropicalized” proportionality balancing. In this context, the term 
“tropicalization” is used to describe the fact that the Courts have made the test 
their own, adjusting it to their particular jurisprudence by combining elements 
from the original German test, the American based differentiated levels of 
scrutiny, and elements from their own constitutional standards.  
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The Tropicalization of Proportionality Balancing: The Colombian 
and Mexican Examples 
 
Introduction 
 
Ever since the Constitutional State replaced the Legislative model –all of 
which resulted in the Constitution becoming the norm that occupied the pinnacle 
of the legal system–, the question of “how do we interpret it?” has troubled the 
minds of scholars and courts alike. The issue is common to European and 
American styles of judicial review, because as long as there is an organ that 
must determine the meaning of the constitutional text, questions as to how to do 
so will arise.1 
Even though the problem is similar, the method of approaching it has been 
different in both sides of the world. In the field of rights adjudication the American 
Supreme Court and the European tradition have developed differentiated 
techniques: the former –that normally deals with concrete review– has created an 
enormous amount of jurisprudence establishing an assortment of tests with 
varying intensities, ranging from rational basis review to strict scrutiny, while the 
latter has chosen a different path –particularly in the past twenty years– identified 
as proportionality balancing.  
The method known as proportionality balancing started essentially with the 
German Constitutional Court –although the European Court of Human Rights 
also played a part– that set forth in their jurisprudence a new and innovate way to 
                                                 
1
 Roughly, it is possible to differentiate European and American traditions in the following 
terms: on one hand, European –and Latin American– countries have Constitutional or 
Supreme Courts, established by the Constitution itself and fashioned in the model 
designed by Hans Kelsen; on the other, the American style is a judicial creation born in 
Marbury v Madison.  
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deal with rights adjudication that has since become the common language in the 
field of constitutional argumentation in many parts of the world.2 
Latin America has not been left out of the argumentative loop. Even 
though traditionally countries in this region have been influenced by American 
trends, this work deals with how proportionality has infiltrated Colombia and 
Mexico, aimed at identifying if the countries have imported the traditional 
European model, or if they have retained American influence.  
 The countries chosen provide the opportunity of contrasting a new Court 
to an old institution, each with its own argumentative style. Colombia’s Court is 
known as possibly the most progressive in Latin America –and one of the most in 
the world– despite the fact it is one of the youngest ones in existence –created in 
1991–. In opposition, the Mexican Supreme Court is better identified as a more 
traditional and mature organization, sitting before the enactment of the 1917 
Constitution en force today.3  
Our study is guided by the following questions: what is proportionality 
balancing? How has it been used by the Colombian and Mexican jurisprudences 
and what are its influences? Do the Courts cite other jurisdictions when using the 
test? Have they imported a traditional European test? Or have they tropicalized 
it?  
By tropicalization I mean to ask if the Courts have made the test their own, 
adjusting it to their particular jurisprudence and added new or different elements 
from the original courts. My thesis is precisely this, that both Courts have 
                                                 
2
 Since proportionality balancing is a product of Europe, in general, and Germany, in 
particular, I will use the terminology German Test and European Test indistinctively.  
3
 It is important to mention that even though the Mexican Supreme Court has well before 
the 1917 Constitution, the jurisprudence identified as valid is the one issued since 1917, 
identified as Quinta Época (Fifth Epoch). Another relevant note is that the Mexican 
Judiciary was completely restructured in 1994 though a constitutional amendment, which 
effectively transformed the Supreme Court into a Constitutional Court with abstract 
review, concrete review, and individual complaints under its jurisdiction –they are known 
as acción de inconstitucionalidad, controversia constitucional, and amparo respectively–. 
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effectively tropicalized proportionality balancing as they have adapted the test to 
their own circumstances by combining European and American elements.4  
 
What is proportionality?  
Proportionality balancing came to life as a tool for a new type of 
constitutionalism that viewed the founding document not only as a set of rules but 
as a richer universe that also contains principles and values, and must be 
interpreted accordingly.  
The problems that call for its use are not the simple cases in which two 
rules compete against each other but rather the hard cases in which principles 
and values come into play that –because of their incommensurability– demand a 
different approach.   
Robert Alexy explains that proportionality and principles are two closely 
related concepts: 
The nature of principles implies the principle of proportionality and vice 
versa. That the nature of principles implies the principle of proportionality 
means that the principle of proportionality with its three subprinciples of 
suitability, necessity (use of the least intrusive means), and proportionality 
on its narrow sense (that is, the balancing requirement) logically follows 
form the nature of principles; it can be deduced from them. The Federal 
Constitutional Court has stated in rather obscure terms that the principle 
of proportionality emerges ‘basically from the nature of constitutional right 
themselves’.5  
Scholars point out that the use of the word proportionality began in Europe 
in the late 1960s. According to Sánchez González it was the German 
Constitutional Court that in 1968 recognized the prohibition for excess 
(Übermassverbot) and the principle of proportionality (Verhältnis 
mässigkeitsprinzip) as rules that were applicable to all State activities deriving 
from the rule of law.  
In the terminology that was developed, the prohibition for excess and 
proportionality in the broad sense were treated as equivalents, while 
                                                 
4
 Because the central focus of this work is proportionality and not American tests, the 
conceptual framework deals exclusively with the former.  
5
 ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. 66 (OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 
2002).   
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proportionality in the narrow sense was the balancing requirement (Abwägung). 
The latter was introduced in the Luth ruling, where the Court argued that since 
the Constitution must be understood as dynamic whole that encompassed an 
objective scale of values, the interpreter had to balance them in the context of the 
litigation.6  
The test is aimed at determining if the State’s intervention on an 
individual’s fundamental rights is constitutional, establishing in each case the 
hierarchy of the confronting principles.  
As applied by the German Constitutional Court, proportionality balancing 
involves a three-tier test that will evaluate a State action that an individual has 
proved that prima facie constitutes a violation of his rights:  
a) Suitability (Geeignetheit): The legislative measure or State action must 
be coherent with the legitimate end it was designed to achieve. In other words, if 
the mean is suitable to achieve the desired end, it will pass this stage. On the 
contrary, if the measure is not related to the end, it will be struck down.  
b) Necessity (Erforderlichkeit or Notwendigkeit): The question at this point 
is whether the end can be equally well achieved by the use of other means less 
burdensome to the individual –i.e. a least restrictive means test–.  
c) Proportionality in the strict sense or balancing (Proportionalität or 
Abwägung). The final stage of the test is to ask if even though the measure is 
narrowly tailored by the first two standards, it fails in terms of proportionality in 
the narrow sense because it infringes more on a right that it ought to in 
constitutional terms. This final stage is the core of the German test, what Dworkin 
would characterize as taking rights seriously.  
For Alexy, the third sub-principle expresses the meaning of optimization 
relative to competing principles, that is identical with his Law of Balancing that 
states: the greater the degree of non satisfaction of, or detriment to, one 
principle, the greater must be the importance of satisfying the other.7  
                                                 
6
 Santiago Sánchez González, De la Imponderable Ponderación y Otras Artes del 
Tribunal Constitucional, TEORÍA Y REALIDAD CONSTITUCIONAL, 12, 2003 at 9, 10.  
7
 Id. at 401. 
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The author further explains that while principles are optimization 
requirements relative to what is legally and actually possible,8 the three 
subprinciples in question are not principles in that sense but actually rules, as the 
question is whether they are satisfied or not, and their non-satisfaction leads to 
illegality. He further states that while the principle of proportionality in its narrow 
sense follows from the fact that principles are optimization requirements relative 
to what is legally possible, those of necessity and suitability follow from what is 
factually possible.9  
Having laid out the general structure of the German proportionality test, 
the next step of this work is to examine how it has been applied in Colombia and 
Mexico.  
 
The Colombian Case 
Proportionality balancing appeared in Colombian jurisprudence via 
violations on the principle of equality, and it has achieved its greatest growth on 
this field. 
The first time the Court introduced the test was on ruling T-422/92 decided 
on June 19, 1992, where it had to rule on a possible violation of the right of 
equality in relation to the merits of the appointment of public servants. Instead of 
taking a traditional approach to equality, the Corporation specifically cited the 
doctrine of the European Court of Human Rights in arguing that not all different 
treatments will result in discrimination but only those that are not justifiable under 
constitutional terms. The relevant arguments are the following: 
Formulas for pointing out when a difference is relevant  
12. The principle of equality has the characteristic of being a rule in 
modern constitutions, with the inclusion of modern criteria that determines 
specifically prohibited categories, that have lead all constitutional 
jurisdictions to create formulas aimed at establishing when one is facing 
an irrelevant difference, and thus, a discrimination. The most important 
are the reasonableness of the difference and the proportionality of the 
means incorporated in the means and ends of the norm in question.  
                                                 
8
 Values belong in the axiological realm, as opposed to principles that work at 
deontological level. 
9
 See Alexy, supra note 2, at 67.  
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Objective and reasonable justification 
13. According to the European Court of Human Rights, not every 
difference is a discrimination: equality is only violated if the difference 
lacks an objective and reasonable justification, and the existence of such 
justification must be appreciated in light of the ends and the effects of the 
measures considered, with a reasonable relationship of proportionality 
between the means used and the ends desired.  
Reasonableness of the norm 
14. The pairing of the principle of equality with the requirement of 
reasonableness in the difference does not solve the problem regarding 
which must be the criteria that the judge must choose when evaluating 
the work of the legislator. The constitutional judge must not only contrast 
his reason with the legislator, even less so when he is judging the 
constitutionality of a legal norm. Jurisdiction is a cultural way of producing 
the law; the power of the judge derives exclusively from the community 
and only the latter’s judicial conscious allows the former to make a 
decision on the reasonableness of the legislator’s will.  
Proportionality of the norm 
15. On the other hand, the means chose by the legislator must not only 
be in proportion to the ends sought out by the norm, but must also share 
its legitimating. The principle of proportionality seeks not only that the 
measure has a legal base, but also that it is applied in such a way that the 
legal interests of other people or groups are not affected, or only in a 
minimal way. This way, the community is safeguarded against the 
excesses or abuses of power that would come from the indiscriminate 
use of the legislative power or the discretion granted to the administration.  
The burden of argumentation 
16. The linking of the principle of equality and the prohibition of State 
arbitrary action necessarily supposes a procedural issue regarding who 
has the burden of argumentation on the reasonableness of a different 
treatment. If the argued inequality comes from a distinction made from the 
legislator, and its validity is denied, then the burden of proven the 
reasonableness is put upon the organ that defends the law; on the other 
hand, the one who questions the law for considering it ignores substantial 
differences, must give reasons to support his reasoning.10  
Through this argumentation one can identify the beginning of a 
proportionality test strictly linked to the principle of equality. The most important 
elements of this elementary test are: the objective and reasonable justification, 
the reasonableness of the norm, its proportionality, and the burden of 
argumentation.  
                                                 
10
 Action of tutela number T-298, Jorge Eliecer Rangel Peña v. Recursos Naturales 
Renovables y del Ambiente, INDERENA, decided by the 7th Chamber of Revision of the 
Constitutional Court, 1992.  
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Two years after this judgment came the first appearance of what the 
Corporation called a “reasonableness test” in ruling T-230/94 decided on May 14, 
1994. The case dealt with unions and the principle of equality and the Court’s 
development of the test was as follows:  
6. With the purpose of clarifying the justification of the differentiated 
treatment, the analysis of the norm can be phenomenologically divided 
into several elements. This process is known as the “reasonableness 
test”. 
C. The “reasonableness test”. 
1. The linking between the factual differences and the “pattern of equality” 
must be such that the differentiated treatment is justified. To reach this 
end international doctrine has pointed out the following defining aspects 
of the justification: 
1. Difference between the facts. 
2. The existence of a normative purpose (end or value) in the different 
treatment. 
3. Constitutional validity of the proposed purpose. 
4. Effectiveness between facts, norm, and end.  
5. Proportionality in the relationship of effectiveness.  
2. The “test” has the advantage of showing the complexity of the 
hermeneutic judgment, separating elements that usually are left 
untouched in a general perspective. However, this perspective is a victim 
of the contrary defect that one is trying to avoid: the lack of unity. When 
considering each one of the 5 step is an autonomous variable, one has 
the impression of a purely logical and mechanical analysis that forgets the 
real problem of balancing that is at stake, which is no other than the 
reasonable interpretation.  
2.1. Of the steps provided in the “test”, the first, that refers to the 
difference in facts, more than an element of analysis in treatment is a fact 
that is proved empirically (inequality in the facts). The next two following 
elements can be joined in a single normative study related to the valid 
end (reasonableness) ad the justification of the decision that creates a 
difference. The effectiveness between the relationship of the normative 
means and the end or constitutional value (rationality), as well as its 
adjustment (proportionality) can be joined in a single moment, which is 
undoubtedly the decisive and most complex point.   
The term “proportionality” is one of relationship between objects, or part 
of them, quantifiable for reasons of degree, intensity, magnitude, or 
another purpose. The idea of adjustment, on the other hand, is broader 
and introduces an estimative and circumstantial connotation that is better 
for constitutional analysis of values. Yes, when the interpreter analyzes 
the whole, composed by the facts, the norm that creates a distinction, and 
the pattern of equality, he performs a unique act, very much like the 
Luisa Conesa 
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circumstances he is judging. His task is not to subsume the facts in the 
legal norm and the former, in turn, in the constitutional norm with the 
purpose of verifying a logical fitting from the particular to the general.  The 
constitutional judge is actually called upon to understand –with all the 
semantic force of this word– the relationship of the adjustment of the 
elements. It is a hermeneutical task in which the elements make up an 
organic whole and not just the sum of separable parts.11  
It is evident that the Colombian Court took the application of the 
“reasonableness test” quite seriously. It devoted a great deal of time in explaining 
not just the mechanics of the test but also why it was the best way to deal with 
rights adjudication. It is not the case that it simply imports a model from 
international doctrine, but rather that it is preoccupied with justifying its new 
approach in balancing.  
The finalized version of its method of dealing with proportionality and 
equality can be found in C-022/96 –a case that dealt with privileges given to 
students that had done military services– decided in January 23rd, 1996. In this 
occasion the Court devoted more analysis to the element of proportionality –as 
applied by the German Constitutional Court– in its own “reasonableness test”. It 
argued: 
German scholars, studying the jurisprudence of the German 
Constitutional Court, have shown how the concept of reasonableness can 
be applied satisfactorily only if it is concretized in a more specific one, that 
of proportionality. The concept of proportionality is an important tool when 
balancing constitutional principles: when two principles collide, because 
the application of one implies the reduction of another’s, it is the task of 
the constitutional judge to determine if this reduction is proportional in 
light of the affected principle’s importance. 
The concept of proportionality encompasses three partial concepts: the 
fitting of the chosen means in achieving the desired end, the necessity of 
using those means to achieve the end (that there is no least restrictive 
means that can achieve the end and that is less intrusive to other 
constitutional principles) and the proportionality in the strict sense 
between means and ends, that is, that the principle that is satisfied by 
achieving the end does not sacrifice other more important constitutional 
principles.  
When it comes to equality, proportionality means that a differentiated 
treatment does not infringe on this principle if one can prove that it is 1) 
fitting to the achievement of a constitutionally valued end, 2) necessary, in 
                                                 
11Action of tutela number T-28139, Juan de Jesús Jiménez v. COOP-FEBOR, decided 
by the 3rd Chamber of Revision of the Constitutional Court, 1994. 
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other words, that there is no other means that is less harmful, in terms of 
the sacrifice of the other constitutional principles, to achieve the end, and 
3) proportionate, this is, that the differentiated treatment does not sacrifice 
values and principles (including equality) that have more weight that the 
principle that is to be satisfied by the treatment.12  
In its jurisprudence the Colombian Court has developed a “European 
inspired” reasonableness test, that links equality to proportionality in the German 
sense. But it didn’t stop there. Carlos Bernal Pulido –the author that has devoted 
the most time in analyzing the relationship between equality and proportionality in 
Colombian jurisprudence– explains that it is possible to distinguish three different 
types of tests in Colombian rulings: a European that is based on proportionality 
with equal intensity; an American that distinguished different levels of intensity, 
and combination of the two: 
1. The judgment of equality as a test judgment of proportionality in the 
jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court 
A first version of the judgment of equality developed by the Constitutional 
Court in several rulings, adopts the basic elements of the test of equality 
that is applied by the European Court of Human Rights, and the Spanish 
and German Constitutional Courts –the former through the “new 
formula”–, structured through the principle of proportionality. The Court 
has referred to this methodology as “proportionality” and “reasonableness 
test”, which regardless of its own terminology, as we stated in other 
occasions, cannot be treated as synonyms.  
 (…) 
2. The judgment of equality with three types of scrutiny  
According to the Constitutional Court, the second of its lines of 
jurisprudence on the principle of equality, “with roots in the jurisprudence 
of the Supreme Court of the Unites States” –takes elements from the 
most recent American jurisprudence related to the equal protection clause 
established in the 14th Amendment– “is based on the existence of 
different levels of scrutiny or “tests” of equality (strict, intermediate, or 
weak)”. It’s a scale of intensities on the application of the principle of 
equality. 
(…) 
III. The integrated equality judgment 
1. The Constitutional Court’s version 
In the ruling c-93 of 2001, the Constitutional Court tried to build an 
“integrated equality judgment”, that combines the advantages of the 
                                                 
12
 Action for unconstitutionality C-022/96, made by Alvaro Montenegro García, decided 
by the Colombian Constitutional Court, sitting en banque, 1996.  
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European test –structured around proportionality– with those of the 
American method. It was about harmonizing the analytical clarity that the 
proportionality test offers, with the possibility that each one of its 
subprinciples can be applied with a different intensity, according with the 
extension of the appreciation that the Legislator or the Administration has 
in the relevant subject.13 
The Colombian Court has done something unique. It has, on the one 
hand, applied the German and the American tests to its own circumstances and, 
on the other, has given us an example of tropicalization creating a new doctrine 
that combines both and is a fundamental tool in its constitutional analysis.  
The study of the 3rd type of Colombian test –which constitutes 
tropicalization at its best– will not be done here but rather through the Mexican 
example because, as we shall see, the latter adopted the test very recently and 
only embraced the integrated judgment of the Colombian jurisprudence, adding 
some elements of its own as well.  
 
The Mexican Case 
Even though the Mexican Court is older than its Colombian counterpart, its 
story when it comes to proportionality is very recent. It was in late 2004 when the 
Court began using proportionality balancing, using a “reasonableness test”         
–again, mainly in the field of equality– that is based on to the integrated 
Colombian test, but has its own particularities when it comes to varying the 
degree of intensity.  
The Mexican interpretation of the “reasonableness test” was born in its 
amparo rulings ADR 988/2004 and AR 1629/2004. The first is a criminal case 
and the second a tax, but both deal with equality. They are the first two 
precedents that gave way to the jurisprudence titled “EQUALITY. CRITERIA 
FOR DETERMINING IF THE LEGISLATOR RESPECTS THIS PRINCIPLE” 
which presents the test in the following terms: 
Equality in our constitutional text constitutes a complex principle that not 
only grants people the guarantee that they will be equal to the law (in their 
                                                 
13
 Carlos Bernal Pulido, El Juicio de la Igualdad en la Jurisprudencia de la Corte 
Constitucional Colombiana, Universidad Externado de Colombia, 5, 8, 13, available at 
http://www.cajpe.org.pe/rij/bases/nodiscriminacion/BERNAL.PDF. 
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condition of recipients of norms and users of the judicial system), but also 
in the law (in relation to its content). The principle of equality must be 
understood as the constitutional requirement to treat equals equally and 
unequals unequally, and because of this sometimes making distinctions is 
forbidden, while in others it is permitted, or even constitutionally 
demanded. When the Supreme Court of Justice decides a case in which 
the law distinguishes between two or many facts, situations, individuals or 
collectives. To do so, it must determine first if this distinction rests on 
objective and reasonable ground: the legislator cannot arbitrarily 
introduce differentiated treatments, but it must do so with the aim of 
reaching admissible ends within the limits marked by the Constitution, or 
clearly included in it. Secondly, it is necessary to examine the rationality 
or fitting of the distinction made by the legislator: it is necessary that the 
introduction of the difference constitutes an apt mean to achieve the end 
or objective, that is, that there is an instrumental relationship between 
ends and means.  Thirdly, it must comply with the proportionality 
requirement: the legislator cannot try to reach legitimate constitutional 
objectives in an openly disproportionate manner, and because of this the 
judge must determine if the legislative distinction is within the measures 
that can be considered as proportionate, taking into account the facts, 
objectives, and constitutional goods affected; reaching for a constitutional 
objective cannot be done at the expense of an unnecessary or excessive 
affectation of other constitutionally protected goods and rights.  Lastly, it 
is of great importance to determine in each case what is the equality 
referent, because equality is both a principle and a right of a 
fundamentally adjective nature that is always applied in relation to a 
particular situation, and this is relevant in the constitutional control of 
laws, because the Constitution allows the legislator in some instances 
more freedom to carry about his duty, while on others it requires the 
Judge to be specially demanding when determining if the legislator has 
complied with the burdens of the principle in question.14  
Through the above mentioned jurisprudence the Mexican Supreme Court 
established its 3-tier reasonableness test that –when dealing with equality– will 
be applied in the following terms:  
a) First determine if the end is objective and constitutionally admissible;  
b) Second analyze the rationality of the measure, which translates into an 
instrumental relationship between means and ends;  
c) And third study the proportionality between means and ends, 
determining if the quest to achieve a constitutional purpose does not translate 
into an unnecessary or excessive transgression of other constitutional values, 
                                                 
14
 IGUALDAD. CRITERIOS PARA DETERMINAR SI EL LEGISLADOR RESPETA ESE 
PRINCIPIO CONSTITUCIONAL, Primera Sala de la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la 
Nación (S.C.J.N.), Semanario Judicial de la Federación y su Gaceta, Novena Época, 
tomo XXIV, Septiembre de 2006, Tesis 1a./J. 55/2006, 75 (Mex.).   
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verifying if there is a less restrictive measure that the legislator could have 
chosen.  
After studying the Colombian jurisprudence, one can conclude that this 
test is almost identical to their integrated test. It is important to distinguish an 
important difference: the Mexican variation stops short of the “proportionality in 
the strict sense” component, setting the highest bar in the least restrictive means 
test, which leads to striking down far less legislation and state action.  
In adding its own touch of tropicalization, the Mexican Court created 
another jurisprudence titled “EQUALITY. CASES IN WHICH THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL JUDGE MUST USE STRICT SCRUTINY IN JUDGING 
LEGISLATIVE CLASSIFICATIONS (INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF THE 
MEXICAN CONSTITUTION)”, aimed at establishing varying degrees of scrutiny, 
in line of the Colombian integrated test, but modifying it in light of the 
particularities of Article 1 of the Mexican Constitution: 
(…) Article 1 of the Federal Constitution establishes several cases in 
which strict scrutiny is called for. In its first paragraph, it proclaims that all 
individuals must enjoy all the guarantees the text grants, which cannot be 
qualified or suspended but in the cases and conditions the text 
established, which evidences the constitutional desire to ensure in the 
broadest terms the enjoyment of fundamental rights, and that their 
limitations are few, according to the exceptional characteristic the 
Constitution points out. Because of this, whenever a classification done 
by the legislator infringes on fundamental rights, it will be necessary to 
apply with strict scrutiny the requirements derived from the principles 
equality and non-discrimination. In turn, its third paragraph shows the will 
of the legislator to extend the guarantee of equality to fields that are 
broader than the constitutional scope, as it prohibits the legislator to incur 
in acts of discrimination regarding ethnicity, nationality, gender, age, 
disabilities of any kind, social status, health, religion, opinion, preference, 
or civil status, or any other that goes against human dignity and has the 
object of annulling or transgressing the rights and liberties of the people. 
The Constitutional intention is, therefore, to extend the implicit guarantees 
in the equality principle to the field of legislative action that have a 
significant impact in liberty and human dignity, as well as those that relate 
to the series of suspect classification visible in paragraph three, without 
implying that the legislator is absolutely forgiven to use said categories, 
but only that he must be very careful in doing so. In those cases, the 
Luisa Conesa 
 - 13 -  
constitutional judge must analyze the legislator’s work under strict 
scrutiny, through the looking glass of the equality principle.15  
The interpretation of Article 1 of the Mexican Constitution allowed the 
Court to build a standard for strict scrutiny while applying the reasonableness 
test.16 Later, it also developed a standard for a weaker scrutiny –closer to 
American rational basis review– in the economic field, through the jurisprudence 
titled “CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS. ITS INTENSITY IN LIGHT OF THE 
DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLE AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS”: 
According to the reasons exposed by this Chamber in the jurisprudence 
titled ““EQUALITY. CASES IN WHICH THE CONSTITUTIONAL JUDGE 
MUST USE STRICT SCRUTINY IN JUDGING LEGISLATIVE 
CLASSIFICATIONS (INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF THE 
MEXICAN CONSTITUTION)”, whenever the classification done by the 
legislator transgresses on fundamental rights, it will be necessary to apply 
strict scrutiny in accordance to the requirements of the equality principle 
and non-discrimination. In a similar manner, in those cases in which the 
constitutional text limits the discretion of Congress or the Executive, the 
intervention and control of the constitutional court must be greater, in 
order to respect the design established for these purposes. It is clear that 
the normative force of the democratic principle and separation of powers 
brings the consequence that other State organs –amongst them, the 
constitutional judge–, must respect the liberty of configuration bested 
upon Congress and the Executive, according to their own powers. 
Accordingly, the severity of constitutional control is inversely related with 
the degree of liberty of configuration given to the creators of the norm. In 
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 IGUALDAD. CASOS EN LOS QUE EL JUEZ CONSTITUCIONAL DEBE HACER UN 
ESCRUTINIO ESTRICTO DE LAS CLASIFICACIONES LEGISLATIVAS 
(INTERPRETACIÓN DEL ARTÍCULO 1o. DE LA CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LOS 
ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS). Pleno de la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación 
(S.C.J.N), Semanario Judicial de la Federación y su Gaceta, Novena Época, tomo XX, 
Diciembre de 2004, tesis 1a. CXXXIII/2004, 361 (Mex). 
16
 The text of Article 1 is as follows: 
Article 1 
In the Mexican United States all individuals shall be entitled to the privileges and 
immunities granted by this Constitution. Such privileges and immunities shall not be 
restricted or suspended, but in the cases and under the conditions established by this 
Constitution itself. 
Slavery shall be forbidden in Mexico. Every individual who is considered as a 
slave at a foreign country shall be freed and protected under the law by just entering 
national territory. 
Discrimination based on ethnical or national origin as well as discrimination 
based on gender, age, disabilities of any kind, social status, health condition, religious 
opinions, preferences of any kind, civil status or on any other reason which attempts 
against human dignity and which is directed to either cancel or restrain the individuals’ 
privileges and immunities, shall be prohibited. 
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this way, it is evident that the Constitution requires a modulation of the 
reasonableness test, which in no way implies that the Court is renouncing 
the exercise of its powers. To the contrary, in the case of the legislation 
concerning economic or tax matters, as a general rule, the intensity of 
constitutional analysis must not be strict, with the object of respecting the 
political liberty of the legislator in fields like the economic, where the 
Constitution itself establishes a wide capacity of intervention and 
regulation in favor of the State, considering that, when the constitutional 
text grants the State a margin of discretion it means that the possibility of 
action in favor of the constitutional judge is narrower and, accordingly, the 
intensity of control is weakened. In those fields, a very strict control would 
lead the constitutional judge to substitute itself in the legislative power –or 
the extraordinary capacities given to the Executive–, because it is not the 
work of the judiciary, but of the political bodies, to analyze if the economic 
classification are the best or if they are necessary.17  
Through the abovementioned jurisprudences the Mexican Supreme Court 
has built its particular scheme of proportionality, through a mix of the integrated 
Colombian test and its own Constitutional mandates.  
The finalized version can be explained in the following terms: there are 
two opposite sides of constitutional control, strict scrutiny on one hand –which 
the Court also refers to as “super motivation”– and weak scrutiny –that the Court 
calls “legislative deference” and would best be identified with American rational 
basis review– on the other. The reasonableness test will vary in light of the 
subject in accordance to those categories.  
Defining what level of scrutiny should be applied is part of the 
constitutional analysis process, just like the reasonableness test. The steps that 
the Mexican Court will take in said process –when it comes to the principle of 
equality, which has the most development in Mexican jurisprudence– can be 
explained by the subsequent series of questions: 
1. Has the plaintiff argued a case based on the principle of equality? 
2. Has the plaintiff given the tertium comparationis –a basis for 
comparison– and the defendant supported the burden of proof? 
                                                 
17
 ANÁLISIS CONSTITUCIONAL. SU INTENSIDAD A LA LUZ DE LOS 
PRINCIPIOS DEMOCRÁTICO Y DE DIVISIÓN DE PODERES. Primera Sala de la 
Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación (S.C.J.N),  Semanario Judicial de la Federación y 
su Gaceta, tomo  XXIV, Noviembre de 2006, Tesis 1a./J. 84/2006, 29 (Mex.).  
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3. Is the tertium comparationis within the scope of the principle of 
equality? 
4. Is the differentiated treatment based on suspect classification? If the 
answer is positive, it will lead to strict scrutiny in the reasonableness 
test. 
5. If it is not a suspect classification, then what is the level of intensity 
must be applied? If it is an economic matter, the test will be weaker, 
similar to a type of rational basis review. It is also possible to 
acknowledge the possibility of an intermediate review based on other 
categories. 
6. Is the differentiated treatment justified? This is the application of the 3-
tier reasonableness test.  
For example, in the case of a criminal disposition –that inflicts a person’s 
fundamental right to liberty– the judge can ask if the road chosen by the legislator 
was the most suitable means to achieve the desired end, whereas in the tax 
subject the Court must stay one step back, and only ask if there isn’t an 
unnecessary violation of other rights, but not striking down legislation because 
the legislator didn’t choose another road that that the Court might have 
considered better. 
In short, the Mexican Court will only apply strict scrutiny –which, as 
mentioned, stops at the least restrictive means test and doesn’t go as far as 
proportionality in the strict sense– in the extraordinary cases when the 
Constitution itself calls for it. Seeing as economic and tax petitions constitute the 
majority of work for this Court, striking down a law based on strict scrutiny will be 
rare occurrence.  
 
Conclusion: the Tropicalization of Proportionality Balancing 
After having reviewed the way the Colombian and Mexican Courts deal 
with rights adjucation through their particular versions of proportionality 
balancing, one cannot help but conclude that they have tropicalized the 
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European tests, adding elements from their own constitutional orders and 
American jurisprudence to finally create their own standards.  
On one hand, the Colombian Court got a head start on the Mexican and 
was more explicit in citing comparative law. First, they adopted the German test 
with proportionality in the strict sense, and then used the American versions as 
far varying degrees of scrutiny, finally creating an integrated test that combined 
the two.  
On the other hand, the Mexican Court in recent years adopted the 
Colombian model –without explicitly saying so– but decided to modify the varying 
degrees of scrutiny in relation to its reading of the Mexican Constitution, stopping 
at the least restrictive means level. In the end, they created standards for what 
American scholars would call rational basis review and strict scrutiny, in 
combination with the German test.  
In a final word I would like to emphasize the fact that tropicalization is not 
a pejorative attribute, but rather the process of explaining how constitutional 
control is part of a global community in which doctrines are easily exported and 
adapted to best fit the needs of each jurisdiction.  
